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[BOOKS]

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[Forthcoming] A Telic Theory of Trust Forthcoming with Oxford: OUP, UK.

[Forthcoming] Epistemology in the Subpersonal Vale (with R. Rupert) Forthcoming with Oxford: OUP, USA

[2023]. Stratified Virtue Epistemology: A Defence Forthcoming with Cambridge University Press.

[2023] Digital Knowledge. Routledge. (DRAFT 31 Oct 2021)

[2022] Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing. Oxford: OUP (link to OUP page) (reviewed at NDPR here). 

[2021] The Philosophy of Group Polarization (with F. Broncano Berrocal) Routledge. [Podcast interview]

[2021] This is Epistemology (with C. Littlejohn). Wiley-Blackwell.

[2018]  A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How  (with T. Poston), Critical Introductions to Contemporary Epistemology series, ed. S. Hetherington, Bloomsbury. (link)

[2016] Metaepistemology and Relativism.  Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy series, eds. Hendricks, V. & Pritchard, D. (PDF) Reviewed here and here. 

 

[EDITED BOOKS]

 

[Forthcoming] The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement (with M. Baghramian and R. Rowland). London: Routledge.

[2021] The Epistemology of Group Disagreement  (with F. Broncano-Berrocal). London: Routledge.

[2021] Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation  (with P. Bondy). London: Routledge. 

[2018] Socially Extended Epistemology (with A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[2018] Extended Epistemology (with A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[2017] Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind (with E.C. Gordon & B. Jarvis). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  (Introduction) (OUP page)

[2017] The Moral Psychology of Pride (with E.C. Gordon). Moral Psychology of the Emotions series, (series editor, Mark Alfano), Rowman & Littlefield. (link)

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[JOURNAL ARTICLES]

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[Forthcoming] What the Tortoise Should Do: A Knowledge-First Virtue Approach to the Basing Relation  (with L. Miracchi Titus). Noûs. (PDF|DOI)

[Forthcoming] Trust and Trustworthiness Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2023] Intentional Action and Knowledge-Centred Theories of Control (with J. Shepherd). Philosophical Studies 180: 957–977  (PDF)|(DOI)

[Forthcoming]  Simion and Kelp on Trustworthy AI Asian Journal of Philosophy. (PDF)

[2022] Refitting the Mirrors: On Structural Analogies in Epistemology and Action Theory (with L. Miracchi) Synthese 200(9): 1-28.  (PDF)|(DOI)

[2022] Knowledge, Practical Knowledge, and Intentional Action (with J. Shepherd). Ergo, (9). (DOI)

[2022] On Some Intracranialist Dogmas in Epistemology Asian Journal of Philosophy 1:44 (DOI)

[2022] Therapeutic Trust Philosophical Psychology  (DOI)

[2022] How to be an Infallibilist (with C. Kelp and M. Simion). Philosophical Studies 179: 2675–2682 (DOI)

[2022] Trust as Performance. Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Noûs. 32, 120–147 (PDF)

[2021] De Minimis Normativism: A New Theory of Full Aptness. Philosophical Quarterly 71(1): 16-36.[Winner of the 2019 Philosophical Quarterly Prize Essay Competition.] (PDF)

[Forthcoming] Epistemic Value in the Subpersonal Vale (with R. Rupert) Synthese. (PDF)

[Forthcoming] Understanding a Communicated Thought (with E.C. Gordon and J.P. Grodniewicz). Synthese. (PDF)

[Forthcoming] Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning (with R. McKenna) Canadian Journal of Philosophy. (PDF)

[Forthcoming] Technologically Scaffolded Atypical Cognition: The Case of YouTube’s Recommender System (with M. Alfano, A. Fard, P. Clutton, and C. Klein) Synthese. (PDF)

[Forthcoming] Trust, Distrust and Epistemic Injustice (with D. Meehan) Educational Philosophy and Theory  (NON-FINAL PDF)

[Forthcoming] On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust Philosophical Studies. (PDF)   [Forthcoming] Varieties of Cognitive Integration (with J. Kallestrup) Noûs. (PDF)

[Forthcoming]  Exercising Abilities Synthese. (PDF)|(DOI)

[Forthcoming]  Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill and the Regress Problem Philosophical Studies. (PDF)|(DOI)

[Forthcoming] Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology (with R. McKenna) Erkenntnis

[Forthcoming] Radical Scepticism and the Epistemology of Confusion International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. (PDF)

[Forthcoming] Educating for Intellectual Virtues: A Critique from Action Guidance (with B. Kotzee and H. Siegel). Episteme. (PDF)|(DOI)

[Forthcoming] Knowledge-How, Understanding-Why and Epistemic Luck: An Experimental Study (with D. Pritchard and J. Shepherd), Review of Philosophy and Psychology). (PDF)|(DOI)

[Forthcoming] Autonomy, Cognitive Offloading and Education Educational Theory. (PDF)

[Forthcoming] Archimedean Metanorms  For Topoi  (special issue on Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory and Epistemology, (ed.) P. Bondy and D. Godden). (PDF)|(DOI)

[Forthcoming] Sosa Versus Kornblith on Grades of Knowledge (with R. McKenna) Synthese (PDF)|(DOI)

[Forthcoming] Intellectual Autonomy, Epistemic Dependence and Cognitive Enhancement Synthese. (PDF)|(DOI)

[Forthcoming] The Philosophy of Memory Technologies: Metaphysics, Knowledge and Values (with R. Heersmink) Memory Studies. (PDF)|(DOI)

[Forthcoming] Sosa on Knowledge, Judgment and Guessing. Synthese, special issue on the Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, (ed.) C. Kelp. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2019] The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement (with D. Pritchard). Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44(2): 242-240. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2018] On Behalf of Controversial View Agnosticism European Journal of Philosophy  26(4): 1358–1370. (DOI)

[2018] Meta-Epistemic Defeat. Synthese 195(7): 2877–2896 (PDF)|(DOI)

[2018] Technological Seduction and Self-Radicalization  (with M. Alfano and M. Cheong)  Journal of the American Philosophical Association  4(3): 298-322 (PDF)|(DOI) [Reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual, Vol. 38, Patrick Grim, Eduardo Martinez, Angela Sun and Elise Wood (eds)] 

[2018] The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of the Debasing Demon (with P. Bondy). American Philosophical Quarterly 55(3): (PDF)|(DOI)

[2018] Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement and Control Metaphilosophy, special issue on Connecting Virtues (eds. M. Croce and M.S. Vaccarezza), 49(3): 283-304. (PDF)

[2017] The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How (with J. Navarro) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95(3): 662-685. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2017] Virtuous Insightfulness Episteme 14(4): 539-554  (PDF)|(DOI)

[2017] (Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis (with B. Czarnecki). Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 98(1): 374–397 (PDF)|(DOI).

[2017] The Modal Account of Luck Revisited. (with M. Peterson). Synthese 194(6): 2175-2184. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2017] Semantic Inferentialism as a Form of Active Externalism (with J. Collin and S.O. Palermos). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16(3): 387 - 402. (PDF)|(DOI)

 [2017] Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic Hypocrisy. Synthese 194(5): 1463-1476 (PDF)|(DOI)

[2017]  Googled Assertion (with E.C. Gordon) Philosophical Psychology 30(4): 486-497. (PDF) 

[2017] Is Having your Computer Compromised a Personal Assault? The Ethics of Extended Cognition (with S.O. Palermos). Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2(4): 542–560  (PDF)|(DOI)

[2016] On Epistemic Consequentialism and the Virtue Conflation Problem (with I.M. Church). Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5(4): 239-248.(PDF)|(DOI)

[2016] Knowledge, Assertion and Intellectual Humility (with E.C. Gordon). Logos & Episteme 7(4): 489-502  (PDF).

[2016] Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions (with M. Peterson and B. van Bezooijen). The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7(4): 817-834 (PDF)|(DOI)

[2016] Belief without Credence. (with B. Jarvis and K. Rubin).  Synthese 193 (8): 2323–2351. (PDF)|(DOI).

[2016]  Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory (with J. Kallestrup). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research  92 (3): 691–714. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2016]  On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Reply to Steglich-Petersen (with M. Peterson). Erkenntnis 81 (2): 297-304 (PDF)|(DOI)

[2016]  Extended Knowledge-How (with B. Czarnecki). Erkenntnis 81 (2): 259-273 (PDF)|(DOI)

[2016]  Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives (with D. Pritchard). Philosophical Studies 173 (4): 969-990 (PDF)|(DOI)

[2016]  Robust Virtue Epistemology as Anti-Luck Epistemology: A New Solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly  97(1): 140-155. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2016]  Epistemic Internalism, Content Externalism and the Subjective/Objective Justification Distinction (with S.O. Palermos). American Philosophical  Quarterly 53(3): 231-244. (PDF).

[2016]  Extended Emotion (with E.C. Gordon & S.O. Palermos).  Philosophical Psychology 29(2): 197-218. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2016]  Richard Rorty and Epistemic Normativity (with E. Kerr).  Social Epistemology 30(1): 3-24. (DOI)

[2016]  Group Peer Disagreement. Ratio 29(1): 11–28.  (PDF)|(DOI)

[2015]  Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value (with D. Pritchard).  Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4): 799-816. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2015] Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat. Ergo 2 (28): 711-735. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2015]  Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism (with S.O. Palermos). Erkenntnis 80: 753-772. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2015] Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck (with D. Pritchard). Noûs  49 (3): 440-453. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2015] Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement (with D. Pritchard).  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91(1): 181-199. (PDF)(DOI)

 [2015] Varieties of Cognitive Achievement. (with B. Jarvis & K. Rubin). Philosophical Studies 172 (6): 1603-1623. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2015] On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle (with M. Peterson). Erkenntnis 80 (1): 1-13. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2015] On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu & Persson (with E.C. Gordon). Bioethics, 29 (3): 153-161. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2014] Openmindedness and Truth (with E.C. Gordon). Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 44 (2): 207-224. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2014] Varieties of Externalism (with J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos & D. Pritchard). Philosophical Issues (supplement to Noûs), 24 (1): 63-109. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2014] On Testimony and Transmission (with P. Nickel). Episteme 11(2): 145-155. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2014] A New Maneuver Against the Epistemic Relativist (with E.C. Gordon). Synthese 191(8): 1683-1695. (PDF) |(DOI)

[2014] Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision. Erkenntnis 79 (1): 155-172. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2014] Objectual Understanding and the Value Problem (with E.C.Gordon). American Philosophical Quarterly  51(1): 1-14. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2014] Relativism, Knowledge and Understanding. Episteme, 11 (1): 35-52. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2013] Extended Cognition and Epistemic Luck. Synthese 190 (18): 4201-4214. (PDF)|(DOI)

 [2013] Knowledge and the Value of Cognitive Ability (with B. Jarvis and K. Rubin), Synthese 190 (17): 3715-3729. (PDF)|(DOI)

 [2013] Knowledge: Value on the Cheap (with B. Jarvis and K. Rubin). Australasian Journal of Philosophy  91 (2): 249-263. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2013] Intelligence,Well-Being and Procreative Beneficence (with E. C. Gordon). Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (2): 122-135. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2013] A Problem for Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. 

Erkenntnis 78 (2):  253-275. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2012] Against Swamping (with B. Jarvis). Analysis 72(4): 690-699. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2012] Is Epistemic Expressivism Incompatible with Inquiry? (with M. Chrisman). Philosophical Studies 159: 323-339. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2012] On Stanley’s Intellectualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20(5): 749-762. (DOI)

A Note on Assertion, Relativism [2012] and Future Contingents. Logos & Episteme 3(1): 139-144. (DOI) 

[2012] Recent Work on Moore’s Proof. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2): 115-144. (PDF)|DOI)

[2011] Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support (with E.C. Gordon). Philosophia 39 (4): 615-635. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2011] Radical Skepticism, Closure and Robust Knowledge.  Journal of Philosophical Research 36, 115-137. (PDF)

[2011] Kvanvig on Pointless Truths and the Cognitive Ideal. Acta Analytica 26(3): 285-293. (DOI)

[2010] Anti-Luck Epistemology and Safety’s (Recent) Discontents. 

Philosophia 38(3): 517-532. (PDF)|(DOI)

[2008] Just the Right Thickness: A Defence of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology (with G. Axtell). Philosophical Papers 37(3): 413-434. (PDF)

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