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Trusting the Internet (with J. Kallestrup)


Epistemology in the Subpersonal Vale (with R. Rupert, forthcoming, OUP USA)

Knowing How: Action, Luck, and Skill (with T. Kearl)



Skill Proximity and Control (with T. Kearl) (draft)

Easy Practical Knowledge (with T. Kearl) (draft)

A Complete Virtue Epistemology  (with C. Willard-Kyle)

The archaeology of Sosa's epistemology (with K. Sylvan

Ignorance and autonomous belief: Why ignorance is not lack of knowledge  (with O. Piedrahita)

Interrogative Achievements & Wellbeing (with C. Willard-Kyle)

Trust, Vulnerability, and Monitoring (draft)

Debunking the Genetic Fallacy (with R. McKenna) (draft)

The Analysis of Knowledge-How (with J. Navarro) 

Know-How and Expertise (with N. McDonnell) (draft

Inferential Knowledge from Essential Falsehood (with J. Wang)

Augmented Reality and Scepticism 

Fake Knowledge How (with J. Navarro) 

[Papers committed to edited volumes]

Greco on Knowledge Transmission and Shared Intention  for special issue on John Greco's Transmitting Knowledge. 

Talent, Luck, and Achievement 

Abduction, Scepticism, and Indirect Realism (draft) (for a special issue of Philosophical Studies on Sosa's epistemology.

Practical Knowledge, Luminosity, and Aptness (for Knowledge of Ability, eds. B. Vetter and T. Schooner).

Extended Intentional Action (with G. Andrada). For special issue of Social Epistemology on the Mind-Technology Problem (eds. R. Closes, K. Gärtner, G. Theiner.)

Safety and Dream Scepticism in Sosa's Epistemology, invited for special issue of Synthese on Scepticism. 

ChatGPT and testimonial anti-reductionism invited for conference with Nikolaj Pedersen


Knowledge Norms and Conversational Background invited for volume on the Epistemology of Conversation by Waldo J. Silva Film

Abstract: Epistemic norms on conversation have been well studied by way of epistemic norms on assertion — for example: assert that p only if you know that p (e.g., Williamson 1996; 2000). The success of conversations, however, depends on the satisfaction of epistemic norms other than assertoric norms, for example, as recent work suggests, the satisfaction of epistemic norms of interrogative speech acts are likewise critical to a conversation’s success (Willard-Kyle 2021). My aim is to investigate (beyond epistemic norms on assertoric and interrogative speech) a largely overlooked species of epistemic norm with critical import to conversational success — namely, epistemic norms governing our beliefs (as well as presumptions) about the conversational common ground, and — closely relatedly — our beliefs (as well as presumptions) about what our interlocutors believe and presume about the conversational common ground. What will emerge is a defence of a package of knowledge norms whose content concerns the conversational common ground and our (and our interlocutors’) attitudes toward it; the explanatory power of these norms will help make sense (beyond the explanatory power of existing knowledge norms) of why certain conversations — including polarised conversations — fail when they do. 

[In (various stages of) the pipeline]

Aptness, Knowledge, and Action 

The Extended Knower and the Dogmatist (with J. Kallestrup)

Global Relativism and Self-Refutation, Revisited (handout)

Understanding and the Right to an Explanation  (with E.C. Gordon)

The Generality Problem (with B. Madison)


Can you know how to fly a plane if all your training was in virtual reality? 


The Normative Structure of Modal Achievements 


Skill, Luck, and Regression to the Mean

Freedom and Gettiered Foreknowledge


On Flattery (with M. Alfano & E.C. Gordon)


(retired) A Neo-Wittgensteinian Approach to Rational Support Relations (draft)





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